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Abstract: Using data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, this paper describes the 
shape of consumption profiles over the month for Social Security benefit recipients. Individuals with income 
mostly made up of Social Security benefits and who have some savings smooth consumption over the pay 
period, while individuals with little savings consume 25 percent fewer calories the week before checks are 
received relative to the week after checks are received. The findings for individuals with little savings are 
inconsistent with the Permanent Income/Lifecycle Hypothesis, but are consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting. 
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A large number of U.S. citizens are saving too little for retirement. The long-term de¯cit
of Social Security makes this fact particularly troubling. One explanation for individuals
saving too little is that these same individuals are unable to resist the temptation of imme-
diate grati¯cation (Laibson, Repetto & Tobacman 1998). The tempted consumer indulges
in high consumption today while promising herself that she will reduce her consumption
and begin saving for retirement at a future date, yet when that future date ¯nally arrives
she caves in to the temptation of immediate grati¯cation again. Such individuals will
reach an old age with little savings.
In this paper, we provide evidence that elderly individuals with little savings su®er
from self-control problems. We use data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by
Individuals (CSFII) to study di®erences in the shapes of consumption pro¯les over the
pay-cycle for the elderly with di®erent levels of savings. Our empirical analysis uses the
fact that Social Security bene¯ts payments are essentially made on the third of the month.
This information allows us to study the di®erence in how consumption varies with time
since checks were received between two groups: people with liquid savings above and
below $5000. The changes in the di®erence between the consumption pro¯les of these two
groups and the changes within groups reveal patterns that are at odds with the standard
consumer theory.
Individuals with little savings have consumption that is very responsive to Social
Security payments. People with less than $5000 in savings have consumption that is 25
percent lower during the ¯nal few days of the pay-cycle than it is during the ¯rst week. If
shopping is costly and food rots, this decline would not have to be related to self-control
problems. However, the extent to which consumption declines due to food depreciation
is likely to be common to both groups.
Individuals with little savings have consumption that decreases over the month even
2more dramatically when compared to the consumption of individuals with savings. Also,
the rate of the decline in relative consumption of non-savers is increasing over the Social
Security payment cycle. Caloric intake is 11 percent lower for individuals without sub-
stantial savings relative to those who have saved two weeks before the end of the pay cycle
than it is during the week after checks are received, and 35 percent lower during the last
three days of the pay-cycle.
Our ¯ndings are di±cult to explain using the standard Life Cycle/Permanent Income
Hypothesis and exponential discounting. Hall (1978) shows that exponential discounters
with rational expectations and the ability to transfer income from periods in which it is
high to periods in which it is low ought to have unpredictable changes in consumption
around a linear trend. The elderly are perhaps the most likely individuals to satisfy Hall's
assumptions, particularly when forming expectations is easy because their primary source
of income is paid on predictable dates in predictable amounts. The elderly are both ex-
perienced in budgeting and, because they do not have much future income, are unlikely
to face credit constraints. For these reasons, we conclude from our empirical results that
individuals with low savings have short run impatience.1 We check the robustness of
this result by considering and ruling out alternative explanations. The quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model introduced by Phelps & Pollak (1968) and popularized by Laibson
(1997) (1998) provides a parsimonious framework for modelling short run impatience.2
Quasi-hyperbolic discounters discount the consumption between today and tomorrow at
a higher rate than than consumption between adjacent days further in the future, and
this generates time inconsistency. In laboratory and ¯eld studies of time preferences,
individuals (as well as animals) appear to have discount rates that decrease as the time
horizon increases (Ainslie 1992, Thaler & Loewenstein 1989). In their survey of the lit-
erature, Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue (2002) provide evidence that long and
1An early formulation of dynamic inconsistency is Strotz (1955).
2For an axiomatic model of temptation and self-control in which there is no dynamic inconsistency
see Gul & Pesendorfer (2001).
3short-run discount rates di®er in general with a meta-analysis of discount rate estimates
across studies where choices were made over di®erent time-horizons. We simulate the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model to show that, unlike exponential discounting, it gen-
erates consumption pro¯les that decrease at an increasing rate over the pay-cycle, which
is similar to those actually observed for the group with low savings in our data.
A growing number of papers demonstrate that individuals su®er from self-control
problems (Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002). Our paper contributes to this
literature by linking behavior within the month to savings behavior over the entire life
cycle and by providing evidence that possibly not all individuals struggle with self-control
equally. In related research, Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy & Tyler (2004) ¯nd that individ-
uals di®er in their propensity to plan and that this can dramatically in°uence wealth
accumulation over the lifecycle.
Shapiro (2005) uses the 1989-91 CSFII data to study consumption pro¯les of food
stamp recipients and concludes that their behavior is best reconciled with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. He does not consider heterogeneity though, probably because to be eligible
for food stamps individuals need to be poor. Moreover, it is unclear whether his results
are valid for non-food stamps recipients. Our sample, in contrast, represents almost half of
all elderly Social Security recipients, of which only around 8 percent receive food stamps.
Della Vigna & Malmendier (2006) ¯nd that people over-estimate the number of times
they will use the gym when choosing membership packages.3.
A larger literature directly focuses on testing the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hy-
pothesis. Stephens Jr. (2003) uses Consumer Expenditure Data and the predictability of
Social Security receipts to study the response of household expenditures to payments and
¯nds that the amount of money spent increases immediately after checks are received.
Stephens Jr. (2006) studies payday e®ects using U.K. Family Expenditure Survey data
3Hu®man & Barenstein (2005) use U.K. Family Expenditure Survey data to show that expenditures
decline between pay periods and conclude this is largely due to costly decision making when budgeting.
4and again ¯nds that expenditures tend to spike soon after the paycheck receipt. In Ap-
pendix B we show that when food rots and individuals cannot shop continuously it is
optimal to purchase food on payday. By using measures of actual food consumption we
avoid the possible discrepancy between expenditures and consumption, while by focus-
ing exclusively on people at least 62 years old we know that they should have saved for
retirement.
2 Consumption Pro¯les with Quasi-Hyperbolic Dis-
counting (¯± ¡ model)
In this section we simulate the consumption pro¯les of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic
discounters to highlight the di®erences. The quasi-hyperbolic discounter has a discount
rate between immediate consumption and consumption one period later of
1¡¯±
¯± and a
smaller discount rate between consumption in any two future periods equal to 1¡±
± . We
obtain a closed form solution for consumption for the case when the consumer is perfectly
patient in the long run (± = 1) but has a preference for consumption today over con-
sumption tomorrow (¯ < 1). When individuals aren't perfectly patient in the long run
and ± < 1 we solve for the optimal consumption pro¯le numerically.
In order to calibrate the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, it is convenient to


























where ± is the exponential discount factor and ¯ is the quasi-hyperbolic discount factor.
Social Security checks are paid at perfectly predictable times and known amounts, which
5is why there is no uncertainty in our model. These checks are not reinvested. Since
quasi-hyperbolic discounters (¯ < 1) make dynamically inconsistent choices, consumption
pro¯les are superscripted. At time 0, the consumer \0" chooses a consumption pro¯le
fc0
tgt=1;::;T that is going to be di®erent then the one he chooses a day later fc1
tgt=1;::;T.4
The Euler equations are


























We assume Constant Relative Risk Aversion,
























In the appendix we show that when ± = 1, log consumption chosen at time t will be
given by the expression:
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and it is easy to verify that this decrease is increasing over the pay-cycle. Patterns of
log-consumption for a yearly discount rate of 0:97 and di®erent values of daily ¯ are shown
4We assume that ex ante consumers do not realize the inconsistency of their behavior, they are \naive."
If consumers are \sophisticated," meaning that they are aware of their time inconsistent behavior, the
drop in consumption is the same as \naive" individuals if utility is logarithmic (½ = 1), and is be smaller
(bigger) for ½ > 1 (½ < 1) (Pollak 1968). In the case of ½ > 1, as in the case with uncertainty, our
estimated ¯ represents an upper bound on the true instantaneous discount factor.

























































Different values of β 
Figure 1: Monthly consumption pattern
in Figure 1. Log-consumption has been normalized to 0 at time 0 in order to ease the
interpretation of the empirical results that are shown later.
The key qualitative features of the graph is that log-consumption declines at an increas-
ing rate for quasi-hyperbolic discounters, while it can be easily seen that for exponential
discounters with ± · 1 the decline follows a straight line with a slope of log(±)=½. A 20
percent drop in consumption over the pay period can be explained using the following com-
bination of ½ and ±, ¡0:20 = 30log(±)=½. The yearly discount factor, [exp(¡½:2=30)]365,
is 8 percent for ½ = 1, and basically zero for ½ = 4.
73 Data and Sample Restrictions
We use data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, 1994-1996 to
explore the consumption behavior of households containing individuals that receive Social
Security bene¯ts and a member older than 62 years. The CSFII is randomly administered
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to individuals over the month. During the time
period covered by our data, Social Security bene¯ts were paid out on the third of the
month if that date was neither a holiday or on the weekend and otherwise on the ¯rst day
prior to the third of the month that was not a holiday or on the weekend. Between 1994
and 1996, on average 60 percent of Social Security recipients received their checks via
direct deposit and would therefore have access to their bene¯ts on pay dates (SSA 1989{
1996).5 The exogenous variation in interview date and knowledge of pay dates allows us
to identify the e®ect of time elapsed since checks were received on consumption. Survey
respondents were asked to recall everything they ate over the last 24 hours, and the USDA
implemented procedures and prompts developed by the Census Bureau's Center for Survey
Methods Research that would improve response accuracy (USDA 1997). Households were
to be interviewed a second time between 3 and 10 days after initially interviewed. The
attrition rate between the ¯rst and second interview is 10 percent and 22 percent of second
interview dates actually occurred outside the planned window of between 3 and 10 days
after the initial interview. For these reasons we use only the initial interviews.6 We also
exclude individuals that did not know if they were receiving Social Security bene¯ts. The
over-all response rate for the ¯rst interview was 80 percent.
Using actual consumption data allows us to more directly test for consumption smooth-
ing against quasi-hyperbolic discounting than would be possible if only expenditure data
were available. In the appendix we show that it is in fact optimal for consumers to shop
5Between 1989 and 1992 only 51.5 percent of recipients used direct deposit, which makes the CSFII,
1989-1992 less appropriate for our analysis.
6Given the detailed nature of these surveys, survey fatigue may be an issue as well. Our results are
qualitatively similar, though somewhat dampened when both interview dates are used.
8on payday when food depreciates. The intuition is that immediate consumption is pre-
ferred to later consumption and shopping early matches the fresher food with immediate
consumption.
The CSFII data contains observations on 12,364 households of which 2,332 receive So-
cial Security bene¯ts. This yields 3,600 ¯rst day surveys.7 Social security pays disability
on a date di®erent than the date on which it pays bene¯ts, so we restrict our sample to
those older than 62 which leaves 1897 individual surveys. It is possible that by focusing
on households dependent on Social Security with a member older than 62 we have in-
cluded multi-person households with Social Security Disability Bene¯ts, which are paid
on the ¯rst of the month. Since disability bene¯ts become old-age bene¯ts at age 65, this
measurement error is likely to be small and would make our ¯ndings a lower bound on
the true e®ect. We focus on individuals from households in which Social Security income
makes up at least 80 percent of total income, and these individuals make up 41 percent
of our sample. Each household in the CSFII data identi¯ed if they have cash, savings
or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and certi¯cates of deposit valued at
more than $5,000. Unfortunately, no information on the exact level of savings is available.
Because in our sample 94 percent of household incomes lie above $5,000, we simply call
those who answered \yes" savers and those who answered \no" non-savers. Our sample
is roughly divided in half between savers and non-savers.
Table 1 presents regressions of various demographic characteristics on dummies indi-
cating if individuals were interviewed two, three, four, or ¯ve weeks after pay was received.
Most of the dummies are not statistically signi¯cant and are small in magnitude, and this
suggests that the timing of interview date is exogenous. At a ¯ve percent signi¯cance
level, we would expect ¯ve percent of the coe±cients to be signi¯cant even if the true
e®ect were zero.
7There are more ¯rst day surveys than households that receive Social Security because of large house-
holds.
9Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for savers and non-savers. These two groups are
very di®erent from each other. Individuals with savings have higher bene¯ts than non-
savers, which implies that savers had higher labor earnings over their careers. Respondents
with savings are also more likely to be in good health, male, white, and have on average
two more years of education than those without savings.
4 Consumption over the Pay-Cycle
4.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 4.1 contains plots of the logarithm of consumption against time since a bene¯t
check was received for respondents whose Social Security income comprised at least 80
percent of total income. All results are qualitatively similar when the sample is broadened
to include households with Social Security income at least 70 percent of total income8. We
¯rst look at consumption in terms of caloric intake and the probability of eating a meal out.
The graphs are locally weighted regressions of both weighted daily average and weighted
daily residual consumption measures on time elapsed since pay was issued. Residual log
consumption and the residual probability of eating out were obtained by ¯rst partialling
out with a linear model other factors that in°uence food consumption including usual
monthly food expenditures, gender, household size, age, an age-gender interaction, health
indicators, highest year of schooling completed (with a dummy variable for missing values),
height, race, retirement status, self-reported, a dummy indicating whether the respondent
receives food stamps, and additional dummy variables indicating month, day of the week,
survey year, region, typical shopping frequency, and MSA status. Interview date is not
thought to be correlated with determinants of consumption aside from duration since
paycheck, but controlling for other determinants will increase precision. The solid graphs
8Including household with lower levels of relative Social Security income increases the sample size, but
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Days since check arrival
Consumption and Eating Out over the Pay Period
With (dashed light lines) and without (solid dark line) savings
Figure 2: Log-Consumption
Notes: Figures are locally weighted regression plots of weighted daily average log consumption and
weighted daily average residual log consumption and the probability of eating out and residual
probability of eating out over the Social Security pay-cycle for households with bene¯ts that are at least
80 percent of total income.
are for individuals with assets valued at less than ¯ve-thousand dollars, and the dashed
graphs are for individuals with assets of a value more than ¯ve-thousand dollars. We use
the CSFII provided survey weights throughout to insure that our sample is representative
of the U.S. population.
The consumption of households with higher valued liquid assets is fairly °at. In con-
trast, caloric intake for those with little savings is decreasing. Initially caloric intake is
roughly the same for low savings individuals than for high savings individuals, though
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0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
Residual Log−Consumption over the Pay Period
With (dashed light lines) and without (solid dark line) savings
Figure 3: Log-Consumption
Notes: Figures are locally weighted regression plots of daily average residual log consumption over the
Social Security pay-cycle for households with bene¯ts that are at least 80 percent of total income where
total log calories are controlled for along with determinants of consumption described in text.
12savings individuals during the last ¯ve days of the pay-cycle. Caloric intake is almost 20%
lower than average thirty days after pay is received for individuals without substantial
savings. A comparison of this pattern with the simulated ones of Figure 1, reveals that
assuming an intertemporal rate of substitution of 1 and a yearly discount rate of 0.03 im-
plies that the instantaneous discount factor ¯ is close to 0.95. Reducing the intertemporal
rate of substitution to 1/4, so that a 10 percent rise in relative prices causes a 2 percent
reduction in relative consumption, gives ¯=0.8. Households with low savings also con-
sume a larger proportion of meals they eat out soon after their paycheck than households
with higher savings.
Total caloric intake falls over the pay-cycle for individuals with little savings. We next
explore how the content of the typical diet for savers and non-savers changes over the pay-
cycle. Figure 4.1 contains plots of locally weighted regressions of log residual consumption
measures. The residuals were obtained by regressing the log of grams of protein, fat, and
carbohydrates, ¯ber, cholesterol, and an average of 10 vitamins9 on the log of caloric intake
and the same additional controls used to construct Figure 4.1. The ¯gures imply non-
savers diets contain more fat and cholesterol towards the end of the pay-period. If poor
quality foods are high in fat and cholesterol, this implies that the quality of consumption
declines over the paycycle for households with Social Security bene¯ts recipients that have
little savings. Households with Social Security bene¯ts recipients that did not save do
not smooth consumption because of the sharp declines in consumption during the last
week of the pay-cycle. The non-linear decrease in log-calories is more in line with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and rules out heterogeneity in either exponential discount rates or
intertemporal rates of substitution.
The sudden drop in food consumption, in terms of both quantity and quality, for the
elderly without savings also has implications for health. Figure 4.1 contains plots of the
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0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
Probability over the Pay Period
With (dashed light lines) and without (solid dark line) savings
Figure 4: Probability of eating less than RDA over
the pay period
Notes: These ¯gures are locally weighted regression plots of
the probability of consuming calories less than recommended
daily amount and its residual over the Social Security
pay-cycle for households with bene¯ts that are at least 80
percent of total income.
probability of consuming less than the USDA recommended consumption level for total
calories. During the ¯nal week of the pay-period the likelihood of not consuming enough
calories increases by nearly 15 percent for individuals without savings.
4.2 Regression Estimates
We carry out inference by estimating how consumption of non-savers changes over each
of the weeks after Social Security is received relative to savers. The following model is
¯tted to the data:






¼tNosavei £ Week ti + X
0
iµ + "i
Ãfe = ´m + ´y + »d + ºr
14where lnci denotes the natural log of consumption for household i, Nosavei is a dummy
equal to one if household i has less than $5,000 in liquid assets, Week ti is a dummy equal
to one if household i most recently received Social Security bene¯ts t weeks ago, and X0
i
is a vector of characteristics for household i. We include the same characteristics used to
produce the graphs.10 The term Ãfe is the vector of ¯xed-e®ects in the model, including
month ¯xed e®ects ´m, year ¯xed e®ects ´y, day of the week ¯xed e®ects »d and region
¯xed e®ects ºr.
The OLS estimated coe±cients b Át measure the average percentage change in consump-
tion common to savers and non-savers. The estimates b ¼t on the interaction measure the
percentage change in consumption of non-savers between the ¯rst and tth week after re-
ceiving pay relative to savers. If discounting is exponential then log-consumption would
depend linearly on time elapsed since checks were received (this is true even if households
are unable to transfer income across months), and this would give rise to linearly decreas-
ing coe±cients. The slope of log consumption would be log(±)=½. For reasonable values
of daily discount rates and intertemporal rates of substitution11 the Át's would be close
to zero and the ¼t's would be zero. Savers and non-savers would consume di®erent levels,
but the slope would always be the same. If instead the heterogeneity was in terms of ±
or ½ the slopes of the consumption pro¯les across the two groups would be di®erent but
still linear, that is the ¼t's would be on a straight line as would the Át's.
Although for our sample the consumption drop does not appear to be linear, in order
to compare our results to those of Shapiro (2005), we also estimate a version of the model
10We include usual food expenditure, gender, household size, age, an age-gender interaction, health
indicators, highest year of schooling completed (with a dummy variable for missing values), height, race,
retirement status, a dummy indicating whether the respondent receives food stamps, and additional
dummy variables indicating month, year, day of the week, region, shopping frequency, and MSA status.
11½ is believed to be around 4 and typically not smaller than one.
15where the change over time in consumption is restricted to be linear:
lnci = ® + Ãfe + ° ¤ Nosavei + Áti + ¼ti £ Nosavei + X
0
iµ + "i
Ãfe = ´m + »d + ºr
where here ti is the number of days since checks were received. The average daily
percentage change in consumption common to savers and non-savers is given by the co-
e±cient Á and the average daily percentage decline in consumption of non-savers relative
to savers is given by ¼.
Table 3 contains the results of estimating the unconstrained model for various con-
sumption measures. Column (1) reports the relative change in energy (total caloric intake)
over the pay cycle. The estimates in column (1) imply that the di®erence in caloric intake
between savers and non-savers is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero during the week imme-
diately after checks are received, with a t-statistic on the di®erence of 0.56. The changes
in consumption for the savers relative to their ¯rst week consumption are positive and
insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero for each period. The consumption for non-savers drops
dramatically relative to savers, particularly during the ¯nal few days of the pay period.
During the third week the di®erence increases to -11 percent. During the last few days of
the pay period this di®erence increases to -35 percent (signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at
the .05 level).
Columns (2) through (4) present the results of estimating the unrestricted model
for caloric intake decomposed into grams of protein, fat, and carbohydrates12. Though
insigni¯cant at conventional levels, the point estimates imply that non-savers consume
6.21 percent more grams of protein than savers and 5.15 percent more grams of fat during
the week after checks are received. These measures of consumption also fall dramatically
relative to savers during the ¯nal days before checks are received. The di®erences in
12Here we do not control for calories, as opposed to the plots in Figure 4.1.
16proteins and carbohydrates consumed between the ¯nal two or three days of the pay
period and the ¯rst seven days of the period for non-savers relative to savers are -32 and
-42 percent, respectively. Column (6) presents the results for cholesterol. This measure
of consumption declines relatively little with respect to our other measures.
Table 4 contains the results of estimating the linear model. Caloric intake rises by an
insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero .26 percent per day for savers and falls by -.70 percent
per day for non-savers relative to savers on average. Taken together these estimates
imply that caloric intake falls by .44 percent per day for households without savings. The
estimate of the daily decline in consumption for non-savers is in line with Shapiro's (2005)
study of food stamp recipients. He ¯nds consumption declines of .40 percent per day for
recipients after they receive their stamps.
4.3 Alternative Explanations and Additional Evidence
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the unconstrained model for di®erent subsam-
ples of the data. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample for ease of reference.
An alternative explanation for declining consumption over the month is intra-household
competition for resources. Columns 2 and 3 present results from separately estimating the
model for single and multi-person households. Doing so signi¯cantly reduces the sample
size, and the results are mixed for single person households. While consumption does fall
in the ¯nal days of the pay-period for single people, this estimate is not precisely esti-
mated and an imprecisely estimated small increase in consumption for non-savers relative
to savers was found in the fourth week. The results for multi-person households are much
more similar to the results from the full sample. In two separate questions the CSFII asks
respondents whether they are meal planners for their household and whether they do the
major food shopping. If individuals were competing for food, then respondents who do
the shopping would have an obvious strategic advantage over those who don't. In columns
176 and 7 we ¯nd no strong di®erences in consumption patterns across these groups, casting
doubt on the explanation based on uncooperative behavior among household members.
Households that have little savings and heavy dependence on Social Security may
be more susceptible to unexpected expenses than those with savings. Households with
savings can draw down their savings and continue their usual consumption, while those
without savings may be forced to go with little food if they are liquidity constrained.
CSFII respondents were asked if they had enough food over the past three months. As
long as past shocks are correlated with current shocks we can test the importance of
uncertainty. Column 4 presents estimates of the model for the subsample of respondents
that did not recently run out of food and column 5 presents estimates for those that
did. Curiously, consumption falls dramatically for non-savers who did have enough food
over the past three months and remains constant for non-savers who did not have enough
food sometime over the past three months. Consumption slightly rises over the month for
savers who have not ran out of food recently and falls for those who had run out. This
evidence suggests that for consumers who face larger uncertainties the precautionary
motives that give rise to an increasing consumption pattern dominate the present-bias.
It also suggests that greater vulnerability to negative shocks does not entirely explain the
shape of consumption pro¯les.
Alternatively, in the presence of expenditure shocks some consumers may be more
willing to risk being subject to drastic reductions in consumption. In this case, the
signi¯cant drop of those hit by negative shocks would drive all the results. Since shocks
can be more easily absorbed at the beginning of the payperiod than at the end, this model
would generate heteroskedasticity with respect to elapsed time since check arrival. To test
for heteroskedasticity we ¯rst run a median regression. If the results were driven by a
few outliers, the median e®ects would be lower. What we ¯nd instead is a signi¯cant 43
percent drop between week 5 and week 1 for non-savers compared to savers. We also can
18reject heteroskedasticity using the Breush-Pagan test (at the 28 percent level).13
Individuals with time preferences that display short-run impatience will want to pro-
crastinate when deciding when to undertake costly activities aside from saving for future
consumption (i.e. Akerlof 1991, O'Donoghue & Rabin 1999, DellaVigna & Paserman
2005). We further document the importance of short run impatience by estimating the
shape of consumption pro¯les over the month separately for respondents with di®erent ob-
servable indicators of present bias. Results are reported in Table 6 and are not, in general,
very precisely estimated. Column 1 presents results for people who do and do not con-
sume vitamin supplements. Column 2 distinguishes between smokers and non-smokers,
columns 3 and 4 between drinkers and non-drinkers and heavy drinkers and non-heavy
drinkers, respectively, column 5 by whether the respondent currently rents their home,
and column 6 by whether the respondent shops more than 3 times a month. Taking vi-
tamins indicates smoother consumption and smoking indicates less smooth consumption,
as expected. Individuals who shop more frequently have consumption pro¯les that drop
while those who do not have smoother consumption.
5 Conclusions
We provide evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting amongst the elderly that are reliant
upon Social Security income. Individuals with low savings have consumption pro¯les over
the month that decline dramatically, particularly in the ¯nal week of the pay period.
We cannot prove that individuals with savings are not quasi-hyperbolic discounters, even
though their food consumption pro¯les do not decline over the month. Individuals who
have saved may have knowledge of and access to commitment devices such as illiquid
investments that individuals without savings do not (Bertrand, Mullainathan & Sha¯r
13We regress the squared residuals of non-savers on the elapsed weeks dummies. R2 times the number
of observations has a chi-squared distribution with 5 degrees of freedom.
192004).
More frequent issuance of paychecks would limit the quasi-hyperbolic discounters abil-
ity to indulge in high current consumption at the expense of later consumption. With the
small cost of issuing checks through direct deposit, allowing Social Security bene¯ts recip-
ients the ability to choose more frequent payments would result in a Pareto improvement
upon the monthly schedule. This will be true even if the direct utility bene¯ts are small
given the small cost of sending money via direct deposit and the negative externalities of
medical costs that may result from hyperbolic discounters not eating enough at the end
of the month.
Our results also help justify legislation such as the Pension Reform Bill of 2006 which
encourages employers to enroll employees into 401(k) plans by default and commitment
devices such as the \Save More Tomorrow" plan proposed by Benartzi & Thaler (2004).
Madrian & Shea (2001) show that changing default rules to automatic enrollment in
401(k) plans dramatically increased enrollment rates of new hires by about 30 percent.
The "Save More Tomorrow" plan gave employees at a medium sized company the ability
to commit in advance to putting portions of their future earnings towards retirement
savings. 78 percent of the employees that were o®ered this plan used it.
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24Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Households with Savings Above
and Below $5000
Low savings High savings Di®erence
Food expenditures 233.120 347.557 -114.437
(12.149) (28.850) (26.586)
Social Sec. bene¯ts 772.938 1181.711 -408.773
(26.335) (57.516) (61.313)
Mid-West 0.220 0.378 -0.158
(0.083) (0.116) (0.066)
South 0.401 0.283 0.118
(0.104) (0.091) (0.048)
West 0.112 0.142 -0.030
(0.044) (0.066) (0.040)
Rural 0.309 0.347 -0.038
(0.106) (0.116) (0.059)
Good health 0.284 0.390 -0.105
(0.023) (0.025) (0.031)
Poor health 0.128 0.042 0.087
(0.022) (0.012) (0.025)
Age 73.090 74.738 -1.648
(0.507) (0.431) (0.719)
Male 0.273 0.418 -0.145
(0.023) (0.021) (0.034)
Black 0.204 0.020 0.185
(0.035) (0.013) (0.033)
Years of education 9.117 11.539 -2.422
(0.236) (0.280) (0.320)
Fraction retired 0.757 0.773 -0.016
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040)
Food stamps 0.172 0.003 0.169
(0.024) (0.003) (0.024)
Household size 1.675 1.750 -0.076
(0.072) (0.060) (0.089)
Hight (inches) 65.068 65.997 -0.929
(0.328) (0.278) (0.419)
Observations 399 346
Notes: CSFII data restricted to households older than 62 obtaining Social
Security income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is
de¯ned as having cash, savings or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual
funds and certi¯cates of deposit worth at least $5,000. Standard errors





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29A Derivation of Optimal Consumption Pro¯le
Here we solve for the time t consumer's consumption sequence. Assuming constant relative
risk averse utility, the Euler equations can be written as





















































































































0 = y0 ;


























t = logy0 +
1
½







½ (T ¡ s)
i
B Optimal Shopping Time
During each pay period the consumer maximizes her utility from food consumption. The
pay period is normalized to have length 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that
consumers shop only once every pay period. Food depreciates after it is bought according
to the function f (t ¡ s);f0 < 0;0 · s · 1, where t represents time and s represents
the shopping date. Consumers have a positive discount rate ±14 and receive income y0
every month with certainty. Consumers do not save and are not allowed to borrow. The




































The Euler equations are (FOCc)
@ct;t < s : e




















@ct;t > s : e







14Assuming quasi-hyperbolic discounting would only reinforce the results.















































In order to show that it is optimal to shop at time 0, when the pay check is received,
¯rst we show that at the solution of FOCs the second order condition with respect to s is
positive, which means that one of the two bounds 0 and 1 represents the solution. Using
integration by parts and FOCc, FOCs can be rewritten as





























dt = 0 :
The second order condition (SOC) is
¡f













































Using again integration by parts we get that
¡f

















































32Using FOCs the SOC simpli¯es to
¡f



















which, given FOCc, is positive .
































































dt = 0 :
Similarly FOCs evaluated at 1 is positive, but 1 represents next pay check's 0. The
optimum is therefore to shop as soon as the pay check has been received. Introducing more
shopping days does not change this result. It is therefore not surprising if expenditures
spike on the pay day. It is important to to look at consumption instead of expenditures,
and to control for food depreciation, and for shopping frequency.
33